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Abstract 
The quest for remedies to address harm associated with the impacts of climate change has 
recently seen a surge in complaints based on human rights arguments. The use of human rights 
law as a tool to redress harm caused by climate change depends upon whether a victim can 
substantiate a claim that a duty bearer has contributed to climate change, in such a way as to 
amount to a human rights violation. Qualifying the effects of climate change as human rights 
violations, however, poses technical obstacles concerning causality, retrospectivity, attribution, 
as well as the provision of an adequate remedy. Yet, these obstacles are not insurmountable. 
As scientific knowledge improves, tracing causal connections between particular emissions 
and resultant harms is becoming less difficult. These arguments are being tested in the context 
of the so-called ‘Carbon Majors’ inquiry by the Human Rights Commission of the Philippines. 
The inquiry concerns the responsibility of a group of global corporations – dubbed the ‘Carbon 
Majors’ and including the likes of BP, Chevron, Exxon and Shell – for human rights violations 
or threats thereof resulting from the impacts of climate change. This paper looks at the Carbon 
Majors inquiry to critically appraise the role of human rights law in solving complex questions 
associated with responsibility for the impacts of climate change, until other areas of law raise 
to this challenge. The paper builds on the authors’ experience providing expert advice in the 
context of the Carbon Majors inquiry. The inquiry will therefore be used as a point of departure 
to unpack the questions concerning jurisdiction, causality, retrospectivity, and attribution 
associated with harm for the impacts of climate change.  
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With increasingly strong storms, droughts and wildfires, harm to persons, property and the 
environment associated with climate change has started to become manifest all around the 
world. The 2015 Paris Agreement acknowledges the need to tackle so-called ‘loss and 
damage’–encompassing various forms of permanent and irreversible impacts of human-
induced climate change1 – but has not delivered any concrete means to address this enormous 
problem, so far.2 Yet, climate change is predicted to cause unprecedented damage, which is not 
adequately covered by extant liability and insurance schemes.  
In 2007, Faure and Nollkaemper noted how it was unlikely that litigation would lead to 
decisions ‘whereby plaintiffs would be directly compensated for climate change damage 
suffered’.3 More than a decade later, no court has found that particular emissions relate causally 
to adverse climate change impacts for the purpose of establishing liability. Still, recent years 
have witnessed a surge in climate change litigation all over the world,4 including requests for 
compensation for harm associated with the impacts of climate change.5 Through these test 
cases, litigants are pushing the boundaries of private, public, and administrative law to obtain 
redress for damage to persons, property and/or the environment associated with climate change. 
So far, only a few such cases have been argued on the basis of human rights law.6 But, this 
paper maintains, human rights may be used as a ‘gap filler’ until other areas of law satisfactorily 
address the harm associated with the adverse impact of climate change. 
 
The use of human rights law as a gap filler to provide remedies where other areas of the law 
do not is not new, especially in the environmental context.7 Human rights remedies are not 
designed to redress environmental damage. They have, nevertheless, historically been used as 
an avenue to redress personal and property damage associated with pollution, especially where 
no other remedies are available. The issue is therefore to establish when they can be used in 
relation to the impacts of climate change, and how. 
 
These questions are at the core of the so-called Carbon Majors inquiry by the Human Rights 
Commission of the Philippines. The inquiry was initiated at the request of a group of Filipino 
citizens and non-governmental organisations. The petitioners asked the Commission to 
investigate for the first time the responsibility of global corporations for human rights 
                                                
1 Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016) 55 ILM 740, Art 8. 
2 MJ Mace and R Verheyen, ‘Loss, Damage and Responsibility after COP21: All Options Open for the Paris 
Agreement’ (2016) 25 Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 197, 205–207. 
3 MG Faure and A Nollkaemper, ‘International Liability as an Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for 
Climate Change’ (2007) 26 Stanford Journal of International Law 123, 179. 
4 See the litigation database curated by the Sabin Centre at Columbia Law School: 
<http://climatecasechart.com/>.  
5 See e.g. Saúl Luciano Lliuya v RWE AG, pending in Germany. Lawsuits against the Carbon Majors have been 
lodged in the US, France and the Netherlands. See the reportage in <https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/> 
6 See the analysis in Annalisa Savaresi and Juan Auz. Climate Change Litigation and Human Rights: Pushing 
the Boundaries 9 Climate Law 3 (forthcoming, 2019) 
7 The practice in this area has been the subject of much scholarly interest. See for example: AE Boyle and MR 
Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Oxford University Press 1998); AE Boyle, 
‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’ (2007) 18 Fordham Environmental Law Review 
471; D Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar 2011); AE Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the 
Environment: Where Next?’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 613; DK Anton and D Shelton, 
Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
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violations, or threats thereof, resulting from the impacts of climate change in the Philippines.8 
The petitioners lamented widespread human rights violations associated with the increasingly 
violent typhoons striking the Philippines, and drew on recent climate change attribution 
studies9 to singles out 47 corporations – dubbed the ‘Carbon Majors’ and including the likes 
of BP, Chevron, Exxon and Shell – none of which is headquartered in the Philippines.  
 
The inquiry differs from ongoing climate change litigation against corporate actors for two 
main reasons. First, it is being conducted by a national human rights commission –a quasi-
judicial body normally tasked to look into domestic, rather than transnational, breaches of 
human rights. Second, the remedies that the Commission can offer to the petitioners are 
constrained by its limited capability to affect the behaviour of the Carbon Majors.  
 
The fact that the Commission has decided to proceed with the inquiry is in and of itself ground-
breaking, and has already demonstrated the potential to use human rights remedies available at 
the national level to give a voice and address the grievances of those affected by the impacts 
of climate change.10 When the Commission issues its recommendations in 2019, the 
acknowledgment of the responsibility of the Carbon Majors for the impacts of climate change 
will be a primer, and could potentially engender domino effects, including, eventually, the 
provision of compensation by domestic courts.  
 
This paper looks at the Carbon Majors inquiry to critically appraise the role of human rights 
law in solving complex questions associated with responsibility for the impacts of climate 
change. Building on the authors’ experience providing expert advice to the Philippines Human 
Rights Commission,11 the paper uses the inquiry as a point of departure to unpack the questions 
concerning jurisdiction, causality, retrospectivity, attribution and the provision of an adequate 
remedy. The conclusion provides some reflections on the potential of and limits to the use of 
human rights remedies as a means to address the harm associated with the impacts of climate 
change. 
 
                                                
8 Republic of the Philippines Commission on Human Rights, Case No: CHR-NI-2016-0001, Petition requesting 
for investigation of the responsibility of the Carbon Majors for human rights violations or threats of violations 
resulting from the impacts of climate change (2015). 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/735291/Petitioners-and-Annexes/CC-HR-Petition.pdf> 
accessed 2 November 2018.   
9 The Carbon Majors petition relies on R Heede, ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane 
Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010’ (2014) 122 Climatic Change 229. Subsequent 
studies have furthered Heede’s research. See: PC Frumhoff, R Heede and N Oreskes, ‘The Climate 
Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers’ (2015) 132 Climatic Change 157; and B Ekwurzel and others, 
‘The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2, Surface Temperature, and Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major 
Carbon Producers’ (2017) 144 Climatic Change 579. 
10 As argued in A Savaresi, I Cismas and J Hartmann, ‘EJIL: Talk! – The Philippines Human Rights 
Commission and the “Carbon Majors” Petition’ (22 December 2018) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-philippines-
human-rights-commission-and-the-carbon-majors-petition/> accessed 2 November 2018. 
11 See A Savaresi, I Cismas and J Hartmann, ‘Amicus Curiae Brief: Human Rights and Climate Change’ (Asia 
Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions & the Global Alliance of National Human Rights 
Institutions 2017). 
<http://www.asiapacificforum.net/media/resource_file/APF_Paper_Amicus_Brief_HR_Climate_Change.pdf> 
accessed 2 November 2018. 
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2. Translating harm associated with the impacts of climate change into human rights 
grievances  
 
In the last decade, the special relationship between climate change and human rights 
obligations has increasingly been recognised in the literature,12 by the Parties to the climate 
regime,13 and by human rights bodies.14 A series of Human Rights Council (HRC) resolutions 
have stressed the potential of human rights obligations to ‘inform and strengthen’ climate 
change law- and policy-making by ‘promoting policy coherence, legitimacy and sustainable 
outcomes’.15 John Knox, who served as the first UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and 
the environment between 2012 and 2018,16 prepared a dedicated report on climate change, 
which clarified the framework of human rights obligation relating to climate change, mapping 
existing state practice.17  
 
These developments clearly show that states and international mechanisms acknowledge the 
relevance of human rights law in the fight against climate change and in the implementation of 
climate change response measures,18 and increasingly practice systemic integration in the 
interpretation of obligations under international climate change and human rights treaties.19  
 
                                                
12 See e.g. S Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge University Press 2009); 
‘Symposium: International Human Rights and Climate Change’ (2010) 38 Georgia J Intl & Comp L 511; L 
Rajamani, ‘The Increasing Currency and Relevance of Rights-Based Perspectives in the International 
Negotiations on Climate Change’, (2010) 22 JEL 391; S McInerney-Lankford, Mac Darrow and Lavanya 
Rajamani, Human Rights and Climate Change: A Review of the International Legal Dimensions (World Bank 
2011); O Quirico and M Boumghar (eds), Climate Change and Human Rights: An International and 
Comparative Law Perspective (Routledge 2015); S Duyck, S Jodoin and A Johl (eds), Routledge Handbook of 
Human Rights and Climate Governance (Routledge 2018). 
13 Decision 1/CP.16, Cancun Agreements, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2011), Appendix I, 2 (a). Decision 1/CP.16, 
Cancun Agreements, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2011), Appendix I, 2 (a); and Paris Agreement, Preamble. 
14 HRC Res. 7/23, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/7/23 (2008); Res. 10/4, Human Rights and 
Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/10/4 (2009); Res. 18/22, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/18/22 
(2011); Res. 26/27, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/26/27 (2014); Res. 29/15, Human Rights 
and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/29/15 (2015); Res. 32/33, Human Rights and Climate Change, 
A/HRC/RES/32/33 (2016); Res. 34/20, Human Rights and the Environment A/HRC/34/20 (2017). 
15 See HRC Res. 7/23, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/7/23 (2008); Res. 10/4, Human Rights 
and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/10/4 (2009); Res. 18/22, Human Rights and Climate Change, 
A/HRC/Res/18/22 (2011); Res. 26/27, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/26/27 (2014); Res. 
29/15, Human Rights and Climate Change, A/HRC/Res/29/15 (2015); Res. 32/33, Human Rights and Climate 
Change, A/HRC/RES/32/33 (2016); Res. 34/20, Human Rights and the Environment A/HRC/34/20 (2017). 
16 John Knox was initially appointed to serve as the Independent Expert (2012-2015) and subsequently as 
Special Rapporteur (2015-2018). 
17 OHCHR, Mapping Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and 
Sustainable Environment. Mapping Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, 
Healthy and Sustainable Environment Focus report on human rights and climate change (2014); and OHCHR, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a 
Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, A/HRC/31/52 (2016). 
18 For arguments concerning a rights-based approach to the implementation of the climate treaties, see S Duyck 
and others, ‘Human Rights and the Paris Agreement’s Implementation Guidelines: Opportunities to Develop a 
Rights-Based Approach’ (2018) 12 Carbon & Climate Law Review 191.  
19 As argued in A Savaresi, ‘Climate Change and Human Rights: Fragmentation, Interplay and Institutional 
Linkages’ in S Duyck, S Jodoin and A Johl (12), 42; and A Savaresi ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’ in 
Tuula Honkonen and Seita Romppanen (eds): International Environmental Law-making and Diplomacy Review 
2018 (University of Eastern Finland, 2019) (forthcoming, 2019). 
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Human rights arguments have been successfully made in litigation concerning states’ failure 
to mitigate climate change.20 The scope to make human rights complaints in relation to the 
impacts of climate change, however, largely remains to be tested.  
 
A 2009 report by the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) cautioned 
that qualifying the effects of climate change as human rights violations poses a series of 
technical obstacles, concerning the jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights complaints 
associated with the impacts of climate change; how to attribute responsibility in terms of 
causality, retrospectivity, and apportionment; and what may be regarded as adequate remedies 
for human rights violations associated with the impacts of climate change.21 Yet, recent 
litigation seemingly indicates that these obstacles may not be insurmountable. The historical 
contribution of state and non-state actors to greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change 
is increasingly well documented, and advances in scientific knowledge are making it easier to 
trace causal connections between particular emissions and the resulting harms.22  
 
Even though conventionally greenhouse emissions are attributed to states, it is non-state 
actors that are largely responsible for causing emissions. Recent studies suggest that a group 
of global corporations are historically responsible for the lion’s share of global greenhouse 
gas emissions.23 These studies have prompted a surge in climate litigation against corporate 
actors, within and outside the US.24 The responsibility of corporations for human rights 
breaches associated with climate change has also increasingly come under the spotlight, as a 
result.  
 
As the grim judicial saga associated with the Bhopal disaster well exemplifies, however, it is 
often difficult to obtain redress for damage to persons, property or the environment caused by 
foreign corporate actors.25 This is in spite of the fact that the ‘polluter pays’ principle
 
is widely 
accepted in both international and national law,26 that the law of several countries provides 
joint and several liability regimes, a reduced standard of proof,27 and even regimes of absolute 
liability for ultra-hazardous activities, and of strict liability for professional activities.28  
 
                                                
20 See Savaresi and Auz (n 6). 
21 OHCHR, Report on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights, A/HRC/10/61 (2009), 69-
70.  
22 As argued also in: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, JH Knox, A/HRC/31/52, 1 February 2016, 
paras 36-37.   
23 See R Heede, ‘Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel and Cement 
Producers, 1854–2010’ (2014) 122 Climatic Change 229; PC Frumhoff, R Heede and N Oreskes, ‘The Climate 
Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers’ (2015) 132 Climatic Change 157; and B Ekwurzel and others, 
‘The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2, Surface Temperature, and Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major 
Carbon Producers’ (2017) 144 Climatic Change 579. 
24 In May 2019, the database of Sabin Centre database listed 22 such cases outside the US, but does not 
systematically report information concerning law suits within the US, which are instead widely reported in the 
press. See for example: https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/category/exxon-climate-investigation/.  
25 See U Baxi, Mass Torts, Multinational Enterprise Liability and Private International Law, 276 Rec Des 
Cours 297, 354-55 (1999).  
26 J Adshead, ‘The Application and Development of the Polluter-Pays Principle across Jurisdictions in Liability 
for Marine Oil Pollution: The Tales of the “Erika” and the “Prestige”’ 30 Journal of Environmental Law 1.  
27 E Feess, G Muehlheusser and A Wohlschlegel, ‘Environmental Liability Under Uncertain Causation’ (2009) 
28 European Journal of Law and Economics 133, 137.  
28 Directive 2004/35/CE of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and 
remedying of environmental damage, [2004] OJ L 143/56. 
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In all events, existing liability schemes scarcely seem fit to address harm associated with the 
impacts of climate change. As a matter of scale, climate change is predicted to cause 
unprecedented damage to property, persons and the environment.29 This damage is predictable, 
but only to the extent that we know it will happen, not where and when. Thus, extant liability 
and insurance schemes need to be adapted in order to address the complex restorative and 
distributive justice considerations associated with the impacts of climate change.30 Before this 
happens, human rights arguments may be used on an interim basis to fill in the gap. 
 
Human rights are helpful in dealing with environmental matters, because they are widely 
recognised in both international and national law, as a set of basic rights and freedoms that 
belong to every person.31 The obligations associated with the protection of human rights may 
be enforced both nationally and internationally against states and – to some extent - non-state 
actors,32 and, in certain circumstances, in an extraterritorial context.33 Some states and 
companies have resisted this understanding of the reach of human rights law, maintaining that 
states are the sole bearers of human rights obligations, which only protect those within a state’s 
territory, or in another territory under its effective control.34  
                                                
29 Hoegh-Guldberg, O., et al. ‘Impacts of 1.5ºC Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems’. In: Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response 
to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty , Masson-Delmotte, 
V., et al (eds.) (IPCC, 2018) 
30 As argued e.g. in S Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change’ (2005) 18 
Leiden Journal of International Law 747; M Lee, ‘Climate Change Tort’ (Social Science Research Network 
2015) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2695107 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2695107> accessed 2 November 
2018.  
31 The core international instruments include: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December) 
1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3. Additional specialised 
international instruments include: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195; Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 
3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13; Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered 
into force 022 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 
13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008). Finally, there are regional human rights treaties: African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 
ILM 58; American Convention on Human Rights, (22 November 1969 into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 
123; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950, 
entered into force 3 September 1953) 2889 UNTS 221. 
32 See for example the arguments put forward in A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 
(Oxford University Press 2006). See also A Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations for Non-State-Actors: Where 
Are We Now?’ in F. Lafontaine and F. Larocque, Doing Peace the Rights Way: Essays in International Law 
and Relations in Honour of Louise Arbour, (Intersentia, 2018). Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2641390.  
33 See e.g. M Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy 
(Oxford University Press, 2011); K da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Selected Human Rights 
Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013); M Langford et al (eds), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial 
Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
34 See e.g. Supplemental Amicus Briefs in Support of Neither Party (Kiobel II) in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell 
Petroleum Co, et al, 621 F.3d 11 (2d Cir Sept 17, 2010) 12.  
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Recent developments in international,35 regional36 and national37 law, however, clearly show 
that states are starting to hold companies accountable for human rights violations.38 National 
and international judges are increasingly interpreting the law in a way to impose at least some 
human right obligations upon corporate actors.39 Ongoing negotiations concerning 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights may 
furthermore soon deliver the first international treaty explicitly recognising corporate 
obligations in this connection.40   
 
The Carbon Majors inquiry provides an opportunity to see whether this evolving understanding 
of corporate human rights responsibility extends to the impacts of climate change. As a quasi-
judicial body, the Philippines Human Rights Commission has no power to provide 
compensation to victims of human rights violations. Its inquiry is nevertheless faced with the 
same key questions concerning liability for the impacts of climate change, namely: causality, 
retrospectivity, attribution, as well as the provision of an adequate remedy. The next sections 
therefore look at how these matters have been addressed in the context of the Carbon Majors 
inquiry, thereby translating the complex liability questions associated with the impacts of 
climate change into human rights language. 
 
3. Overcoming the hurdles 
 
The suitability of human rights law to address harm caused by climate change depends upon 
whether a victim can substantiate a claim that a duty bearer has contributed to climate change, 
in such a way as to amount to a human rights violation. In the Carbon Majors inquiry, the 
petitioners must prove that they have suffered human rights violations, which are imputable to 
the Carbon Majors.  
                                                
35 See UNHRC Res 26/9 (2014) ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ A/HRC/RES/26/9, establishing the 
mandate of the Open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights. See also Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, J Ruggie, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework, A/HRC/17/31, 2011 (UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights). 
36 Directive 2014/95/EU of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-
financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups Text with EEA relevance OJ 
L330/1. See also Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (known as the ‘Malabo Protocol’) (adopted 27 June 2014, not yet entered into force), Art. 46. 
37 See e.g. Décret n° 2012-557 du 24 avril 2012 relatif aux obligations de transparence des entreprises en 
matière sociale et environnementale. See the review of this and similar national laws in: Methven O’Brien C 
and Dhanarajan S, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: A Status Review’ (Social Science 
Research Network 2015) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2607888 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2607888> 
accessed 15 May 2019 
38 A Clapham, Human Rights Obligations for Non-State Actors (n 32). 
39 See e.g. Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/26, Award (2016); Vedanta Resources PLC and another v 
Lungowe and others (2019) UKSC 20.  
40 Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Zero Draft, 16 July 2018, available at: 




3.1 Attributing Responsibility 
Determining a prima facie human rights violation associated with the impacts of climate 
change in the Philippines is relatively straightforward. Citing damage to property and persons 
associated with increasingly frequent mega-typhoons, the Carbon Mayors petitioners maintain 
that they have suffered violations of a range of human rights, most saliently the rights to life; 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; food; water; sanitation; adequate 
housing; and self-determination.41 Their contention that there is a link between the impacts of 
climate change and violations of these human rights is supported by numerous HRC resolutions 
and can be regarded as fairly uncontroversial.42  
Determining who is to be held responsible for these human rights violations, however, is much 
more complex. Human rights law hinges on the obligations of states, as primary duty holders. 
While a body of human rights obligations relating to the environment certainly exists,43 the 
obligation to protect human rights does not require states to prohibit all activities that may 
cause all instances of environmental degradation. Instead, states have discretion to strike a 
balance between environmental protection and other legitimate societal interests. However, as 
noted by Knox, states ‘must not strike an unjustifiable or unreasonable balance between 
environmental protection and other social goals.’44 In assessing whether a balance is 
reasonable, national and international health standards may be particularly relevant, with a 
strong presumption against retrogressive measures. In addition to a general non-discrimination 
requirement, states owe specific obligations to members of groups particularly vulnerable to 
harm.45 
 
States’ obligation to address environmental harm that interferes with the full enjoyment of 
human rights arguably extends to human rights violations caused by climate change impacts.46 
As not all states have ratified the same human rights treaties, their obligations may vary to a 
certain extent. Yet, the work of the UN Special Rapporteur has demonstrated that states have 
a set of core obligations in this connection. First, states have procedural obligations to assess 
environmental impacts on human rights and to make environmental information public, to 
facilitate participation in environmental decision-making, and to provide access to remedies.47 
Second, states have substantive obligations to adopt legal and institutional frameworks that 
protect against environmental harm interfering with the enjoyment of human rights.48 Most 
                                                
41 Petition (n 9), p 7. 
42 See UNHRC Res 7/23, A/HRC/7/78, 29 March 2008; UNHRC Res 10/4, A/HRC/RES/10/4, 25 March 2009; 
UNHRC Res 18/22, A/HRC/RES/18/22, 17 October 2011; and UNHRC Res 26/27, A/HRC/RES/26/27, 15 July 
2014.  
43 These obligations were recently compiled by the UN Special Rapporteur JH Knox in UNHRC ‘Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, 
Healthy and Sustainable Environment’ (2018) UN Doc A/HRC/37/59, ‘Annex: Framework principles on human 
rights and the environment’ para 33(c), available at <http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/HRC/37/59> accessed 
2 November 2018. 
44 ibid., para 33(e).  
45 UNHRC ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment 
of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment’ (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/25/53, paras 53 and 80.  
46 UNHRC ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment 
of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment’ (2016) UN Doc, A/HRC/31/52, paras 50-54 and 72-73. 
47 UNHRC ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment 
of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment’ (2012) UN Doc A/HRC/22/43, paras 29-43. 
48 ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, 
clean, healthy and sustainable environment’ (n 38), paras 44-68. 
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saliently for the present purposes, states must take measures to ‘prevent, punish, investigate or 
redress the harm caused [...] by private persons or entities’.49 This state duty to protect the 
human rights of individuals and groups from corporate violations is well-established in the 
interpretative work of UN treaty bodies and UN special procedures, and in international case 
law.50 Indeed, states ordinarily prevent, stop, obtain redress for, or punish third party 
interference through state regulation of private party conduct, inspection and monitoring of 
compliance, or administrative and judicial sanctions.51 
 
Furthermore, the so-called business and human rights regime52 consists of hard and soft rules 
under international and domestic law that regulate the relationship between the state, corporate 
entities and individuals. The regime hinges on the state duty to protect, the corporate 
responsibility to respect, and access to remedy – which form the three pillars of the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights,53 unanimously endorsed by the Human Rights 
Council in 2011. Subordinate to the state’s binding obligation to protect and enforce, the 
Guiding Principles entail a ‘moral responsibility and societal expectation’54 that corporations 
respect human rights ‘understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in the International Bill 
of Human Rights and the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International 
Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’.55  
Although they do not expressly stipulate corporate obligations, newer human rights treaties 
entail provisions that explicitly mention ‘private entities’ and the state duty to protect peoples 
from abuse by such entities.56 These treaty provisions tie in to the dual requirement of the 
                                                
49 ibid., paras 58-61. See also ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating 
to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment’ (n 43) para 3;  and UNHRC ‘General 
Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on states parties to the Covenant’ 
(2004), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para 8. 
50 For an overview of positive obligations in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights see J-F 
Akandji-Kombe Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe: 
Human Rights Handbook no 7, 2007). In the Inter-American system, the stage for the development of positive 
obligations was set in the case Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-AmCtHR 
(Ser C) No 4 (1988). In the African system, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2001) Case No 155/96 is particularly relevant. 
Relevant concluding observations of UN treaty bodies include: UNHRC ‘Concluding Observations: Germany’ 
(2012) UN Doc CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6, para 16; Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
‘Concluding Observations: The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (2011) UN Doc 
CERD/C/GBR/CO/18-20, para 29, and ‘Concluding Observations: Australia’ (2010) UN Doc 
CERD/C/AU.S./CO/15-17. See also I Zimele, Human Rights Violations by Private Persons and Entities: The 
Case-Law of International Human Rights Courts and Monitoring Bodies (EUI Working Papers 2009/8).  
51 See International Commission of Jurists, Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Comparative experiences of justiciability (Geneva 2008), 45.  
52 This section of the paper draws on the reflections in: A Savaresi, I Cismas and J Hartmann, ‘Amicus Curiae 
Brief’ (n 11). 
53 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (n 35).  
54 International Law Association, Committee on Non-State Actors, Washington Conference Report (2014), 12, 
available at <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1023> accessed 2 November 2018.  
55 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (n 35) Principle 12. 
56 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 
2008) 2515 UNTS 3, Arts 4.e, 9.2.b, 20.d, 21.c; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13, Art 2.e. 
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business and human rights regime, with corporations acknowledging their corporate 
responsibilities and states ensuring compliance.57  
This understanding is confirmed by recent interpretative work of treaty bodies and international 
jurisprudence.58 For example, in General Comment No. 16, the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child addresses corporate bodies directly, seemingly as duty-bearers under the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child.59 Equally, the 2016 arbitral award in Urbaser v Argentina60 concluded: 
At this juncture, it is therefore to be admitted that the human right for everyone’s dignity and its 
right for adequate housing and living conditions are complemented by an obligation on all parts, 
public and private parties, not to engage in activity aimed at destroying such rights.61 
Other international courts have relied on the UN Guiding Principles to establish that businesses 
‘must respect and protect human rights, as well as prevent, mitigate, and accept responsibility 
for the adverse human rights impacts directly linked to their activities’.62  
Building on this basis, applicants in the Carbon Majors petition have asked the Philippines 
National Human Rights Commission to find that corporate actors are responsible by for human 
rights violations associated with the impacts of climate change in the Philippines. In particular, 
the petitioners argued that the Carbon Majors have breached their responsibilities to respect 
the rights of Filipino ‘by directly or indirectly contributing to current or future adverse human 
rights impacts through the extraction and sale of fossil fuels and activities undermining climate 
action’.63  
3.2 Causation and retrospectivity 
Under human rights law, victims are saddled with a less stringent burden of proof, when 
compared, for example, with tort law.64 In this regard, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights has specifically recommended that all States strike an appropriate balance between 
‘evidential burdens of proof between the claimant and the defendant company’.65 Similarly, 
                                                
57 M Sornarajah, ‘Linking State Responsibility for Certain Harms Caused by Corporate Nationals Abroad to 
Civil Recourse in the Legal Systems of Home States’ in C Scott (ed), Torture as Tort (Hart 2001). 
58 See discussion in I Cismas and S Macrory, ‘The Business and Human Rights Regime under International 
Law: Remedy without Law?’ in J Summers and A Gough (eds) Non-State Actors and International Obligations: 
Creation, Evolution and Enforcement (Brill 2018) 224-260. 
59 Committee on the Rights of the Child ‘General Comment No. 16 (2013) on State obligations regarding the 
impact of the business sector on children’s rights’ (2013) UN Doc CRC/C/GC/16, para 8. 
60 The company Urbaser was a shareholder in a concession for water and sewage services in the Province of the 
Greater Buenos Aires. The claimants alleged that Argentina’s emergency measures at the time of the 2001-2 
economic crisis caused the concession financial loss and ultimately insolvency. Urbaser started arbitration 
proceedings claiming breaches of the 1991 Bilateral Investment Treaty between Argentina and Spain. Argentina 
raised a counter-claim based on the claimants’ ‘alleged failure to provide the necessary investment into the 
Concession, thus violating its commitments and its obligations under international law based on the human right 
to water.’ Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/26, Award (8 December 2016) para 36.  
61 ibid., para 1999 (emphasis added).  
62 Case of the Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. Suriname, Inter-AmCt HR, Judgment, 25 November 2015  
(Merits, Reparations and Costs), para 224. [emphasis added]. 
63 Carbon Majors Petition (n 5 above) p .21.	
64 J Kokott, The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law: Civil and Common Law 
Approaches with Special Reference to the American and German Legal Systems (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1998) 182. See e.g. Tatar C. v Roumanie, App No 67021/01, (ECtHR 5 July 2007) paras 107-24. 
65 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Improving accountability and access to 
remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse (10 May 2016), UN Doc. A/HRC/32/19, policy 
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the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has noted how ‘shifting the burden of 
proof may be justified where the facts and events relevant for resolving a claim lie wholly or 
in part within the exclusive knowledge of the corporate defendant’.66 
 
At the operational level, the corporate responsibility to respect translates into a duty of due 
diligence, which requires corporations ‘to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they 
address their adverse human rights impacts’.67 Corporate human rights violations can result 
from environmental impacts, for example, related to health, including such impacts that have 
a ‘delayed effect’.68 Corporations should in this connection rely on ‘established and quite 
precise international as well as national standards’ in undertaking due diligence in relation to 
these environmental impacts.69  
When applied to the Carbon Majors, the corporate obligation of due diligence has two crucial 
elements. First, a growing body of research attributes the lion’s share of global emissions to 
the Carbon Majors.70 Second, recent studies suggest that these corporations have long known 
that the production and use of their products contributes substantially to climate change, and 
to the related impacts.71 Indeed, these studies allege that corporations knowingly advanced or 
deliberately promoted misleading information, casting doubt on the connection between fossil 
fuels and climate change.72 It is therefore possible to argue, as the petitioners did, that, on the 
one hand, corporate actors had an obligation of due diligence, and, on the other, that they did 
not attend to this obligation, thus contributing to climate-related human rights violations in the 
Philippines and beyond.73 
 
The issue of so-called retrospectivity does not seem to pose particular challenges in this 
connection. The fact that emissions took place, or at least started, at a time when corporations 
were unaware of their impacts is not in and of itself an obstacle to liability arguments.74 In 
principle, it is possible to argue for responsibility for climate change ever since when 
widespread scientific consensus emerged, and certainly since the establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the adoption of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.75 Similar to the tobacco industry, the Carbon 
Majors have long been aware of the risks associated with their actions, failed to inform the 
public of these risks, and to adopt measures to stop further harm and remedy harm already 
                                                
objective 12.5. See also the Opinion from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2017/more-justice-victims-business-related-human-rights-abuses. Accessed 2 
November 2018. 
66 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment 24’ (2017) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/24. 
67 ibid., Principle 17. 
68 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (n 35) 8 and 53. 
69 ibid. 
70 See above (n 9). 
71 Ibid. 
72 This matter is currently being investigated in the US, in the context of the so-called Exxon climate 
investigation: <https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/category/exxon-climate-investigation/> accessed 2 
November 2018. 
73 ‘Joint Summary of the Amicus Curiae Briefs to the Philippines Commission on Human Rights’ (Philippines 
Commission on Human Rights 2018) 59–60 <www.ciel.org/reports/philippines-joint-amicus/> accessed 2 
November 2018.  
74 Faure and Nollkaemper (n 3) 172. 
75 See e.g. RSJ Tol and R Verheyen, ‘State Responsibility and Compensation for Climate Change Damages – A 
Legal and Economic Assessment’ (2004) 32 Energy Policy 1109; Faure and Nollkaemper (n 3) 174. 
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caused.76 The applicants in the Carbon Majors petition have asked the Philippines National 
Human Rights Commission to regard these elements as an indicator of reprehensibility, and to 
establish responsibility.77 Similar arguments are being made against in ongoing investigation 
for fraud in the US against Exxon.78 
 
3.3 Extraterritoriality 
The Carbon Majors inquiry was initiated to ‘help establish a processes for hearing human rights 
victims especially with regard to transboundary harm, clarify standards for corporate reporting 
and help identify basic rights and duties relative to climate change.’79 The decision to 
investigate human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by actors headquartered outside the 
Philippines, however, was not uncontroversial.  
Some of the respondents challenged the Commission’s jurisdiction to hear the petition, arguing 
that ‘the jurisdiction of a state is limited only to the confines of its physical boundaries’.80 They 
further suggested that the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations is an ‘act of 
interference’ or ‘usurpation’ of other states’ sovereignty,81  and ‘tantamount to an undue 
encroachment on the territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty of such other states where 
Respondents are domiciled and operate’.82  
The petitioners tried to brush these objections aside, asserting that, since the Commission is 
not a court of law, the term jurisdiction ‘should not be construed and applied in the current 
inquiry’.83 In practice, however, the use of the term ‘jurisdiction’ is not limited to courts of 
law, but is commonly applied to any body that exercises governmental powers, such as a court 
or administrative authority,84 or indeed, as in the case of the inquiry, a quasi-judicial body, like 
the Commission. 
                                                
76 See also Martin Olszynski, Sharon Mascher and Meinhard Doelle, ‘From Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons 
from Tobacco for the Future of Climate Change Liability’ (2017) SSRN Scholarly Paper 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2957921> accessed 30 January 2019. 
77 Carbon Majors Petition (n 5 above) p .23. ‘Joint Summary of the Amicus Curiae Briefs (n 73) paras 59–60. 
78 As reported on 24 October 2018, <www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/10/24/new-york-attorney-general-
exxon-climate-fraud/> accessed 2 November 2018.  
79 Roberto Cadiz, ‘New Approaches to Climate Justice: Framing Climate Change as a Human Rights Issue in a 
Global Dialogue – Institute of Environmental Science for Social Change’ <http://essc.org.ph/content/new-
approaches-to-climate-justice-framing-climate-change-as-a-human-rights-issue-in-a-global-dialogue> accessed 
2 November 2018.  
80 See for the motion to dismiss filed by CEMEX in: 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/735291/Corporate_Responses_and_Comments/Cemex_Respo
nse.pdf> accessed 2 November 2018, at 11. 
81 ibid., 16. 
82 See for example the motion to dismiss filed by Shell in 2016, available at: 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/735291/Corporate_Responses_and_Comments/Shell_Respons
e.pdf> accessed 2 November 2018, at 1. 
83 Petitioners’ consolidated reply to the respondent Carbon Majors in the National Public Inquiry being 
conducted by Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines, para 2.5, available at <https://secured-
static.greenpeace.org/seasia/ph/PageFiles/735291/Human_Rights_and_Climate_Change_Consolidated_Reply_2
_10_17.pdf> accessed 2 November 2018.  




When announcing its decision to go ahead with the inquiry, the Commission was careful to 
specify that it was within ‘its constitutional mandate to investigate allegations of violations of 
human rights of the Filipino people’.85  
The arguments concerning the Commission’s powers to look into the Carbon Majors’ 
responsibility for human rights violations in the Philippines merit further consideration. 
States exercise jurisdiction over persons or events outside their territory as a matter of course.86 
The exercise of jurisdiction is generally accepted, as long as there is a clear connecting factor 
between the state exercising jurisdiction and the person or conduct that it seeks to regulate.87 
More specifically, neither prescriptive jurisdiction (i.e. the power to create, amend, or repeal 
legislation), nor adjudicative jurisdiction (i.e. the ability of national courts, tribunals, or other 
bodies exercising judicial functions to hear and decide on matters) is territorially limited to acts 
occurring within a state, whereas enforcement jurisdiction (i.e. the state’s right to enforce 
legislation, for example, by using powers of arrest and investigation) is.88
  
 
The Carbon Majors inquiry needs to fall within one of the established principles of jurisdiction, 
to be in accordance with international law. As we argued elsewhere, the most relevant 
principles in this connection are the territorial and the protective principles.89  
 
The authority of states to exercise legislative or adjudicative jurisdiction over acts that take 
place in their own territory - also known as the territorial principle- is generally uncontested. 
In particular, the subjective territorial principle allows states to exercise jurisdiction over 
activities committed within that state, even if completed abroad. Conversely, the objective 
territorial principle allows a state to exercise jurisdiction over activities that are completed 
within its territory, even if initiated abroad. Both principles therefore allow states to regulate 
conduct with an extra-territorial element. 
 
The territorial principle also allows states to exercise prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction 
whenever the effects of the relevant conduct occur in their territory. The so-called effects 
                                                
85 ibid. 
86 This section of the paper draws on the arguments made in Savaresi, Cismas and Hartmann (n 7) paras 9–22. 
87 See for example R Y Jennings, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws’ (1957) 33 
British Year Book of International Law 146, 146; FA Mann The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 
vol 111 (Recueil des Cours 1964); M Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (n 84); DW Bowett, 
‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources’ (1983) 53 British Yearbook of 
International Law 1; FA Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years, vol 
186 (Recueil des Cours 1984); L Oppenheim and others, Oppenheim’s International Law, vol 1 (9th edn, 
Longman 1996) 456 ff.; R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon 
Press 1995) chapter 4; H Ruiz Fabri and J M Sorel (eds), La Saisine Des Juridictions Internationales (A Pedone 
2006); J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 
chapter VII; M N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) ch 12; and C Staker, 
‘Jurisdiction’ in M Evans (ed), International Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2014). See also Third US 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 1987, vol I, part IV.   
88 At times, states will nonetheless exercise enforcement jurisdiction extraterritorially, this is especially true 
during military operations. See e.g. J Hartmann, Detention in International Military Operations: Problems and 
Process’ (2013) 52 The Military Law and the Law of War Review 304. 
89 See Savaresi, Cismas and Hartmann (n 11), 17-25. 
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doctrine gives states ‘leeway to unilaterally stretch the arm of their domestic laws in order to 
clamp down on harmful acts arising beyond their borders’.90 
 
Already in 1945, in the Alcoa case, Judge Learned Hand noted: 
 
It is settled law…that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for 
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders, which the state reprehends.91  
The effects doctrine has been acknowledged by international tribunals in the Lotus92 and in the 
Arrest Warrant case.93 Currently, it finds wide application especially in relation to antitrust, 
tort, bribery and corruption, security, insolvency, and criminal law.94 Accordingly, and 
contrary to what was suggested by some of the Carbon Majors, the territorial principle does 
not preclude states from regulating conduct or adjudicating in relation to actors outside their 
territory. Quite the opposite is true. The territorial principle provides ample scope for the 
Philippines authorities to exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside the territory of the 
Philippines. On this basis, the Commission could legitimately investigate complaints regarding 
human rights violations carried out by the Carbon Majors, as long as it is satisfied that the 




Finally, the protective principle (also known as ‘competence réelle’) authorizes states to protect 
themselves by regulating and adjudicating in relation to conduct carried out abroad that may 
damage their essential security interests.95
 
The principle applies regardless of the place of the 
conduct or the nationality of the alleged offender or victim. It was initially applied only in the 
context of criminal law, but since the 1980s numerous states have applied it more broadly.96 It 
is generally accepted that the application of the protective principle can only be justified by the 
need to protect the essential or vital interests of the state, but there is little consensus on how 
these should be defined. States have relied on the protective principle on several occasions to 
ensure environmental protection. Both the United States and Canada have, for example, relied 
on the protective principle to exercise their prescriptive jurisdiction over instances of pollution 
in the high seas, through the 1970 Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act and the 1990 Oil 
Pollution Act, respectively.97 Accordingly, the protective principle provides scope for the 
exercise of jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory, and for the Commission to assert its 
                                                
90 C Ryngaert, ‘Jurisdiction Towards a Reasonableness Test’ in M Langford (ed), Global Justice, State Duties: 
The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2013) 194. 
91 US v. Aluminium Co of America, 148 F 2d 416, 443 (2d Cir 1945),) para 118. 
92 SS Lotus Case, 1927 PCIJ (ser A) No 10, 23.  
93 Arrest Warrant 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 2002 ICJ Rep 3, 63, 
Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal.  
94 See International Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (2009).  
95 I Cameron, The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction (Dartmouth 1994).  
96 See e.g. E Rehbinder, ‘Extra-Territoriality of Pollution Control Laws from a European Perspective’ in G 
Handl, J Zekoll and P Zumbansen (eds), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of 
Globalization (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012) 127–135 and J R Nash, ‘The Curious Legal Landscape of the 
Extra-Territoriality of US Environmental Laws’ in G. Handl, J. Zekoll and P. Zumbansen (eds), Beyond 
Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization (Martinus Nijhofff Publishers 2012) 
163. 
97 RB Bilder ‘The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea’ 
(1970) Sea, 69 Mich L Rev 1; Maria Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Cambridge 
University Press, (Cambridge University Press P 2007), 32.  
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jurisdiction to consider complaints related to human rights violations carried out by foreign 
corporations, as long as it is necessary to protect essential or vital interests of the Philippines.  
 
To conclude, even though the Commission did not elaborate on which jurisdiction principles 
it relied on – and indeed did not need to, as, in accordance with the well-established doctrine 
of compétence de la compétence, it is for the Commission to determine the scope of its own 
mandate98 – its decision to carry out the Carbon Majors inquiry implicitly relied on one or the 
other. In this connection, the very fact that the inquiry is taking place has already marked an 
important milestone, by demonstrating that national human rights institutions may look at the 
responsibilities of corporations, even when these are not headquartered in the territory of the 
state where the investigation takes place, as long as the exercise of their powers can be justified 
under one of the principles of jurisdiction .99 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The Paris Agreement set out to address the matter of loss and damage caused by climate 
change, but, at least for the time being, its Parties have excluded using it as a means to establish 
liability for climate change impacts.100 Even though no inter-state litigation has taken place, or 
is likely to take place for the foreseeable future, there has been a marked intensification of 
litigation concerning the impacts of climate change at the domestic and at the transnational 
level.  
 
This paper has shown that human rights law arguments are playing a small but not insignificant 
role in this litigation, and potentially lend themselves to holding to account corporations for 
the impacts of climate change. Historically human rights law has on several occasions been 
used as a gap filler to supply remedies where none are available. In this connection human 
rights remedies may be used to supplement regulatory action to change behaviour, and to help 
address restorative and distributive justice questions associated with climate change impacts. 
 
Should the Philippines Human Rights Commission acknowledge that the Carbon Majors are 
responsible for the impacts of climate change, it would mark a milestone in the history of 
climate change litigation worldwide. The Commission’s findings may furthermore help to set 
the contours of corporate due diligence obligations in relation to climate change, including in 
the extraterritorial context. 
 
This is however an area where human rights law also presents clear limitations. Even when the 
matters of causation and attribution are resolved, human rights remedies are often merely 
declaratory in nature and rarely provide avenues to claim for compensatory damages. Human 
rights law typically provides declaratory relief to name and shame human rights abusers, but 
offers limited, if any, compensatory relief, or means to deter further harm. The Philippines 
Human Rights Commission is a case in point. Its powers are largely limited to declaratory relief 
and rest with the domestic authorities’ limited capability to affect the future behaviour of the 
Carbon Majors. 
 
In conclusion, human rights law remedies are no replacement for a dedicated form of liability 
                                                
98 As argued also in Savaresi, Cismas and Hartmann (n Error! Bookmark not defined.), 4. 
99 Ibid. 
100 ibid., para 51. 
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for climate change impacts. Yet, past experience shows that successful human rights 
complaints can help to bring about a change in attitude by courts and lawmakers.101 In this 
connection, the use of human rights law remedies can contribute to engendering a shift in legal 
culture to deal with one of the most intractable challenges facing humankind. The fact that this 
has not happened yet, does not mean that it cannot happen in future. In this, as well as in many 
other such instances before, where there is a will there is a way.  
 
                                                
101 As suggested for example in Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment’ (n 7) 642.  
